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In the Minority Game (MG), an odd number of heterogeneous and adaptive agents choose between
two alternatives and those who end up on the minority side win. When the information available
to the agents to make their choice is the identity of the minority side for the past m days, it is
well-known that emergent coordination among the agents is maximum when m ∼ log
2
(N). The
optimal memory-length thus increases with the system size. In this work, we show that, in MG
when the information available to the agents to make their choice is the strength of the minority
side for the past m days, the optimal memory length for the agents is always two (m = 2) for large
enough system sizes. The system is inefficient for m = 1 and converge to random choice behaviour
for m > 2 for large N . Surprisingly, providing the agents with uniformly and randomly sampled
m = 1 exogenous information results in an increase in coordination between them compared to the
case of endogenous information with any value of m. This is in stark contrast to the conventional
MG, where agent’s coordination is invariant or gets worse with respect to such random exogenous
information.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minority Game (MG) is one of the best-known
examples of an agent-based model of a complex adap-
tive system. It was introduced as a variant of Brian
Arthur’s El Farol bar problem [1, 2] and from its incep-
tion by Challet and Zhang in 1997 [3], continues to at-
tracted significant attention from researchers in diverse
areas ranging from physics and computer science to so-
cial science and economics [4–13]. The feature of MG
whereby agents benefit by being in the minority makes
it a model of competition for limited resources among
agents - an important feature of many systems ranging
from financial markets and traffic to animal foraging [14].
The model shows a non-trivial collective behavior result-
ing from a mean-field type interaction between heteroge-
neous agents. The behavior of the model has been well
understood by a variety of analytical frameworks, such as
the crowd-anticrowd theory [15, 16], the replica method
[17–19] and the generating functional formalism [20, 21].
In the classical MG model proposed by Challet and
Zhang (henceforth referred to as CZMG), an odd num-
ber of agents N have to select between two alternatives
(say A and B) on each round, independently and simul-
taneously. Those on the minority side win (each receives
payoff 1) and those on the majority side lose (payoff 0). In
CZMG and several of its variants, agents make their se-
lection based on the information about the identity of the
side (whether A or B) that was occupied by the minority
group on each of the previous m rounds. A strategy is
defined as a rule that informs an agent whether to select
A or B on the next round for all possible past contingen-
cies. Apart from such strategies in which agents predict
the future minority side based on the identity of the past
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ones, one may also consider strategies where agents have
access to a more detailed information. In this latter class
of strategies, agents use the number of attendees in the
minority side in the past to predict the future minority
side. Surprisingly, the role of such strategies in MG has
never been investigated previously and there exists a per-
ception that using precise information to make a binary
prediction is redundant and N -dependence of such infor-
mation is analytically undesirable [22]. The effect of such
strategies on the emergent behaviour of MG is the focus
of the present study.
The strategy set in which exact information about the
attendance gets mapped to binary decision is also im-
portant from a practical point of view. It is conceiv-
able that there are many situations in which an agent
not only knows whether she was on the minority side or
not, but also how crowded it was relative to the com-
fort level. In the language of financial markets, in whose
context CZMG is mostly discussed [23], this means that
traders know how many sellers or buyers were there on
each round. A minority game in which rational and ho-
mogeneous agents (as opposed to inductive and hetero-
geneous agents in CZMG) use such information has been
discussed in Ref. [24, 25] (Also see Ref.[26–28]) where
such agents can self-organize to a state with maximum
possible global efficiency.
In this work, we show that the class of strategies where
the agents use exact information about the past atten-
dance in A to make a binary decision, which was over-
looked earlier because of its “undesirable” properties, in
fact helps the agents to self-organize to an efficient state
just as in CZMG, but with notable differences. We show
that when the agents in MG use the exact attendance
in A (or B) as the information to predict the future mi-
nority side, for large enough system size, their optimal
memory-length is 2 independent of N . With the infor-
mation being the attendance in side A, even for m = 1,
the agents perform well when their number is only a few
2hundreds. For m > 2, the efficiency approaches the ran-
dom choice value as N increases. An intriguing result for
the MG with detailed information is that providing the
agents with uniformly sampled randomm = 1 exogenous
information results in a better efficiency than endoge-
nous information with any value of m. Thus, random
exogenous information that is commonly provided to all
the agents helps them to self-organize better. These re-
sults are in stark contrast to the conventional MG with
binary information where the optimum memory length
increases with system size and the global efficiency re-
mains unchanged or decreases with random exogenous
information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we give a precise definition of MG with detailed in-
formation. In section III, we show both analytically and
numerically that agent coordination is optimal when they
retain the information for two previous rounds. In addi-
tion, we show that random exogenous information results
in enhanced coordination between the agents. We also
discuss the effect of different tie-breaking rules that the
agents may employ on the global coordination between
them. Section IV contains discussion and concluding re-
marks.
II. MG WITH DETAILED INFORMATION
The only difference in our present study from CZMG
is in the nature of information available to the agents.
There are N agents who select between two alternatives
(A and B) on each round, independently and simultane-
ously. Those on the minority side receive payoff 1 and
others receive payoff 0. In CZMG, the information avail-
able to the agents is the identity of the minority side
on each of the previous m rounds. A strategy is a rule
that maps the information (a binary string of length m)
to future action (choose A or B). The total number of
strategies is therefore 22
M
. In our present problem, in-
formation available to the agents is the strength of the
minority side on each of the previous m rounds. A strat-
egy is a rule that maps the exact attendance in the past
m rounds to future binary action (An example of such a
strategy for N = 3 and m = 2 is shown in Fig. 1). It is
easy to see that the total number of strategies in such a
case is 2(N+1)
m
.
The time evolution of the game is exactly as in CZMG:
At the beginning, each agent is given a small number of
strategies (say 2) randomly selected from the full set of
possible strategies. During the game, each agent mea-
sures the performance of her assigned strategies by keep-
ing track of how well they predicted the minority in the
past (by keeping a score for each of her strategies). On a
given round, each agent uses her best performing strat-
egy, i.e. the strategy that has correctly predicted the
minority side the most number of times until that round.
We are interested in the collective behaviour of the sys-
tem when agents use such strategies.
Figure 1: An example of a strategy for a minority game with
N = 3 and memory-length m = 2, where agents map precise
information in the past (attendance in side A) to a future
binary action (choose A or B).
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Figure 2: Variation of the inefficiency η (Eq. 1) with the pa-
rameter α = 2m/N for CZMG with two strategies per agent.
The line η = 1 corresponds to the case where agents select
randomly between the two alternatives A and B. Each data
point is obtained by averaging over 100 realizations.
III. RESULTS
In a minority game, the global inefficiency which mea-
sures the strength of fluctuations in the attendance in
side A (or B) about its average value N/2 can be quan-
tified by the inefficiency parameter η,
η =
4
N
〈(r −N/2)2〉, (1)
where r is the attendance in A and 〈 〉 denotes averaging
over a long time evolution in the steady state, and over
different initial conditions. The normalization has been
3chosen so that the inefficiency parameter η of the system
with agents selecting randomly between A and B is 1.
The most interesting feature of CZMG is that for
large enough values of the memory length m, agents self-
organize into a state where the fluctuation in the atten-
dance of a side about its mean value (N/2 because of
the symmetry between A and B) is minimized. Thus in
CZMG, selfish agents who care only about their personal
gain self-organize into a globally efficient state where the
utilization of resources is maximized in comparison to a
simple random choice behavior by the agents where they
select A and B with equal probability. In CZMG, it was
found that for large enough memory length m, η ≪ 1
for a given value of N (See Fig. 2). The value of m
at which η is a minimum is a function of s - the num-
ber of strategies per agent - but is approximately given
by 2m ≈ N . Thus the critical memory length, say mc,
is an increasing function of the number of agents and is
given by mc ∼ log2N [29] (the precise value of mc can
be obtained analytically, see for e.g. Ref. [17, 22]). The
optimal memory-length thus increases with the system
size. For memory lengths that are much smaller than
mc, it was found that the system shows herding behavior
where a large fraction of agents choose the same option
simultaneously. In this case, the global efficiency and in-
dividual payoffs of agents are extremely low and become
much worse than simple random choice behavior by the
agents.
Now we will study the behavior of the inefficiency pa-
rameter η when agents have access to the number of at-
tendees on the minority side for the past m days. As
already mentioned in the introduction, it was argued in
Ref. [22] that if agents use precise information about the
attendance in A to make a binary decision as in our
model, it has issues of redundancy and an undesirable
dependence on system size N . We will show that both
these issues are irrelevant for agent coordination and in
fact the precise information helps the agents to achieve
self-organization into a globally efficient state for a fixed
memory length 2, regardless of the size of the system N .
One of the early results that gave much insight into the
behavior of CZMG was the existence of a reduced strat-
egy space (RSS) in which any two strategies are either
uncorrelated or anti-correlated [29]. It was shown that
the behavior of CZMG is unchanged if, instead of the full
strategy set which is 22
m
in number, one use a reduced
strategy set that contains 2 × 2m strategies. When the
number of strategies in the RSS is much higher than the
number of agents, i.e, when 2 × 2m ≫ N , we get essen-
tially a random-choice behavior with η → 1 (α ≫ 1 in
Fig. 2) and when 2 × 2m ≪ N , a significant fraction of
agents share the same set of strategies and we get very
high fluctuations in the attendance (α ≪ 1 in Fig. 2).
Importantly, for 2 × 2m ≈ N (or when α ∼ O(1) in
Fig. 2), the fluctuation is minimized and we get a highly
efficient system (for s = 2, the inefficiency η is minimum
at α ≈ 0.3374 [17]).
Now, with the information being the exact attendance
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Figure 3: Variation of inefficiency η with system size N for
different values of the memory-lengthm, when agents map ex-
act information to binary action in the minority game. η = 1
corresponds to the case where agents select randomly between
the two alternatives A and B. Each data point is obtained by
averaging over 1000 time steps in the steady state and 250
game realizations.
in A, the full strategy space has 2(N+1)
m
elements. This
is exponentially increasing with N for all values ofm, and
therefore we expect the fluctuations in attendance to be
always of the order of
√
N for large N (the following ar-
guments are hence valid in the large N regime and will
be supplemented by simulation results for the small N
behavior). This has the consequence that many entries
in a strategy table are irrelevant. Of the (N +1) possible
values of the attendance between 0 and N , only
√
N on
either side of the average attendanceN/2 are relevant. So
the full set of strategies only contains about 2(
√
N)m rele-
vant entries. Now, just as in CZMG, we can construct an
RSS out of this relevant set, in which any two strategies
are either uncorrelated or anti-correlated with each other
(strictly speaking, the arguments to construct the RSS in
Ref. [29] will go through in our model only when Nm/2 is
a power of 2. However, here we are interested only in the
scaling behavior of the number of strategies in the RSS
with N). It is easily seen that the number of strategies in
the RSS in our model is P ∼ Nm/2. The behavior of the
model thus depends on the ratio P/N . Three behaviors
are possible: i) For m = 1, P/N ∼ 1/√N . The number
of strategies becomes much smaller than the number of
agents for large N , and hence the inefficiency of the sys-
tem keeps increasing with N . For small N , it may still
happen that the system has η < 1 which is indeed what
we find from simulation results (see Fig. 3). ii) Form = 2,
P/N ∼ O(1), independent of N . The behavior is exactly
the same as the most efficient phase of CZMG and hence
we expect the system to have a constant η < 1, indepen-
dent of the value of N . iii) For m > 2, P/N is strictly
increasing with N . Thus, the number of strategies in
RSS outweighs the number of agents and we expect that
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Figure 4: Variation of inefficiency η with system size N for
two different tie-breaking rules (see text) and memory-length
m = 1.
the system will have the random choice behavior charac-
terized by η → 1 as N is increased.
The results for the inefficiency parameter η as a func-
tion of the system size N from Monte Carlo simulations
is shown in Fig. 3. For simplicity, we consider the case
where there are two strategies per agent. We can see
that for m = 2, the system always has η < 1 and for
large values of N , η ≈ 0.5. For m = 1, the system has
η < 1 for relatively small number of agents, but becomes
inefficient for N & 400 or so. For m = 3 and above (only
m = 3 is shown), the system has η → 1 as predicted.
An important property of CZMG is that most of its
qualitative features are independent of the source of the
information [30, 31], i.e. even if the agents are given a
uniformly and randomly sampled m bits as information
in each round, the behavior of the model remains the
same. In other words, all the agents in CZMG react to
the same piece of information, and it does not matter
whether this information is endogenous or a random ex-
ogenous one. For CZMG, with uniformly and randomly
sampled exogenous information, while the global ineffi-
ciency η remains invariant for α ≤ αc, it increases a bit
for α > αc [31]. In our problem, with the information
being the exact attendance in side A, it is easy to deduce
that when the agents are given a uniformly and randomly
sampled integer between 0 and N as the information in
each round, the problem maps exactly to CZMG (with
uniformly and randomly sampled exogenous information)
with m ∼ log2N . This is because we need log2N bits
to represent an integer of order N . This implies that the
agents will self-organize to a highly efficient state even
when m = 1 if they are provided with such artificial ran-
dom exogenous information instead of information which
is endogenous. Again, this behavior is independent of
the system size N . Indeed, it is found from simulation
studies that, with m = 1 uniformly random exogenous
information, we get η ≈ 0.36. Note that, with m = 2
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Figure 5: Typical time series with Rule 2 (see text) for system
sizes N = 101 andN = 301. Here, NA denotes the attendance
in side A. Periodic fluctuations are seen for a significant range
of values of N , till about N ≈ 250. Successive data points are
joined by a line to guide the eye.
endogenous information, for large N , η ≈ 0.50 (Fig. 3),
which is higher than that with m = 1 random exogenous
information. This can be intuitively understood based
on the fact that, providing the agents with uniformly
random exogenous information essentially increases the
number of strategies in RSS from O(√N ) to O(N ) [here
the Gaussian distribution for the attendance in side A is
replaced by a uniform distribution. One may also con-
sider exogenous information with other possible distribu-
tions. If the distribution ‘stretches’ the original Gaus-
sian, it will lead to better global efficiencies as it will
essentially increase the number of strategies in RSS. As
the uniform distribution is the one which does the max-
imum ‘stretching’ , it should result in maximum global
efficiency among the possible distributions]. Also, with a
uniformly random exogenous information of length m, it
is easily seen that the RSS contains Nm strategies, thus
making m = 1 the optimal choice. Thus, for large N ,
with exact attendance as information in MG, a uniform,
random m = 1 exogenous information results in a better
efficiency than endogenous information with any value of
m.
Another feature of CZMG is that the inefficiency curve
in Fig. 2 is not affected by the precise nature of the rule
that the agents use to break ties between strategies that
have equal scores [Note that in most of the later studies in
MG, agents selects stochastically between her strategy-
tables. See Sec. IV for a discussion of this. The question
of tie-breaking does not arise in such a case]. For exam-
ple, let us consider two plausible tie-breaking rules,
Rule 1: When two strategy-tables have equal score, an
agent will randomly select one of them.
Rule 2: When two strategy-tables have equal score, an
agent will stick to the previously used one. Thus the
agents will change their current strategy-table only when
5another strategy-table gets a higher score.
Rule 1 is what we have used so far to obtain our results.
With exact attendance as information, though the qual-
itative nature of the inefficiency parameter remains the
same with both these rules, there are significant differ-
ences. The variation of η with these two rules for m = 1
is plotted in Fig. 4. As we can see, Rule 2 leads to bet-
ter overall efficiency compared to Rule 1 for a significant
range of values of N . It is interesting to compare typi-
cal time series with Rule 2 for low and high values of N
(shown in Fig. 5). As we can see, we get periodic oscilla-
tions in the attendance for the smaller N (these oscilla-
tions seem to persist for a significant range of values ofN ,
till about N ≈ 250). This is remarkable, since in CZMG
a periodic variation in the attendance is always associ-
ated with very low efficiencies (periodic fluctuations are
seen in CZMG for α≪ 1 regime in Fig. 2) whereas here
it is associated with very high efficiency.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
In this work, we have studied the emergent behavior
in Minority Game when the agents use the information
about the number of attendees in the minority side in
the past to predict the identity of the future minority
side. Such strategies lie at the interface of those con-
sidered in CZMG and the El Farol bar problem which
inspired it (In the El Farol bar problem, agents use in-
formation about the number of attendees in the minority
side in the past to predict the the strength of the future
minority side. The prediction of exact bar attendance
is redundant as an agent’s optimum decision is always
to choose the minority side regardless of the number of
agents there). Using scaling arguments and by numeri-
cal simulations, we showed that the agents who use the
exact size of the minority in the past to predict the fu-
ture minority side will give rise to high global efficiency,
except for the case when a large number of agents retain
the information only from the previous round. In par-
ticular, agents with two-days memory will self-organize
to have a better than random choice efficiency for all
system sizes making it the optimal memory length for ef-
ficient resource sharing. If the agents are provided with
uniformly and randomly sampled exogenous information,
the global efficiency becomes better. Thus random global
information enhances efficiency of resource sharing when
agents have a detailed memory. The theoretical argu-
ments presented depend only on the scaling of the size of
the Reduced Strategy Space with the number of agents
and hence the conclusions should hold for simple varia-
tions of the problem one can think of (for e.g. considering
more number of strategies per agent).
Though the Minority Game is introduced and studied
as a model where inductively rational agents with lim-
ited information could self-organize to an efficient global
state, it is worthwhile to compare the performance of
such agents with agents who are deductively rational.
For the Minority Game in which information about the
past outcomes is not available to the agents, the optimal
strategy of a deductively rational agent, i.e. the Nash
equilibria, were derived in Ref. [18, 32]. Apart from the
symmetric Nash equilibrium, where agents choose A and
B with probability 1/2, there exists asymmetric Nash
equilibria in which 2k agents play pure strategies with k
of them choosing A, k of them choosing B and the rest
N − 2k choosing randomly between A and B with equal
probability. Note that, of these equilibria, the one with
k = (N − 1)/2 corresponds to the most globally efficient
state. For the conventional MG where agents make use
of the information about the identity of the past minor-
ity sides to choose between the two sides, the problem of
finding the Nash equilibria has been addressed in Ref.
[18, 32, 33]. An important consideration in studying
whether the inductively rational agents in the conven-
tional MG can converge to Nash equilibria is whether
they account for market impact or not, i.e. whether each
agent accounts for her own contribution to the aggregate
outcome in each round of the game [18]. This problem
is generally addressed in the case where information is
assumed to be random and exogenous and it is known
that while the agents in CZMG who do not account for
market impact will not be able to converge to Nash equi-
libria, a game in which the agents do account for their
market impact will converge to Nash equilibria with very
high global efficiencies [18, 32–34].
The problem of deductively rational agents in Minor-
ity Game who use the information about the exact size
of the minority in the past to choose between the two
sides has been discussed in detail in Ref. [24, 25]. In
this case, it was shown that the Nash equilibria con-
stitute a win-stay lose-shift type strategy, using which
the agents were able to converge to the maximal efficient
state (k = (N − 1)/2 as described above) very quickly.
The resulting outcome however is a ‘trapping state’ in
which majority of the agents will continue to remain on
the losing side forever. The problem was resolved using
a Co-action framework for deductively rational agents
[25, 35]. It is clear from the results described in the pre-
vious section that while the inductively rational agents
in our present study who use strategy-tables such as that
in Fig.1 to make their future choice were able to perform
better than in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, they were
not able to self-organize to the best possible equilibria.
Whether accounting for market impact will result in an
increase in global efficiency is an open problem. As we
already noted, for the conventional MG, the question of
market impact is usually addressed in a setting where
information is assumed to be uniformly and randomly
sampled exogenous histories and in such a system, agents
accounting for market impact can increase the global ef-
ficiency [18, 32, 33]. As shown in Sec. III, our prob-
lem with uniformly random exogenous information maps
exactly to CZMG with uniformly random exogenous in-
formation and hence the former result should carry over
6even with the inclusion of market impact. However with
endogenous information, it is not clear whether account-
ing for market impact will result in an increase in global
efficiency and whether the steady state will correspond
to Nash equilibria. This issue is worth investigating, con-
sidering the fact that, though the agents in our problem
with m = 2 self-organize to a better than random choice
behavior, the global efficiency thus achieved is much less
than the maximum efficiency achieved in CZMG (com-
pare the minimum in Fig. 2 with the m = 2 curve in
Fig. 3). We only note that, in this case, we will have to
deal with the additional complication that various possi-
ble histories (information about the strength of minority
in the past) in our problem do not have a uniform distri-
bution.
In this work, we have assumed that in each round of
the game, agents use their best-performing strategy, i.e,
the strategy that has accumulated the most number of
points up to that round, to make their future choice. We
may generalize this and consider agents who select prob-
abilistically between their strategies in each round of the
game. In most studies of the conventional MG, it is gen-
erally assumed that the agents select the strategy to use
in a given round of the game probabilistically according
to a logit learning scheme [36]. In this, in each round of
the game, an agent i chooses between the strategy-tables
s in her hand in a probabilistic fashion according to,
Prob{si(t) = s} ∝ expΓUi,s(t), (2)
where Ui,s(t) is the accumulated score of strategy s of
agent i at time t and Γ is an ‘inverse temperature’ which
relates to the speed of learning [32]. In the conventional
MG, it is known that the parameter Γ in the learning
scheme has an effect on the global efficiency only at low
value of the parameter α where a low Γ decreases fluctu-
ations in the attendance and thereby increases global ef-
ficiency [36–38] (Fig. 2 shows the variation of inefficiency
of conventional MG with α for Γ→∞). The case we dis-
cussed in the present work has Γ → ∞, where an agent
always uses her best performing strategy. One would an-
ticipate that, in our problem only the m = 1 (memory-
one) result is going to be influenced significantly by the
introduction of a learning rate Γ. This is because, only
the m = 1 case corresponds to the regime α < 1 of
CZMG where the number of agents outweighs the num-
ber of strategies in the Reduced Strategy Space (see Sec.
III for details). The case m = 2 corresponds to the crit-
ical point α ∼ 1 in CZMG and m > 2 corresponds to
α > 1 where the global efficiency does not depend upon
Γ.
More generally our study invokes questions regarding
the influence of different kinds of information, and pre-
dictions thereof, on the collective statistical properties of
complex adaptive systems like the MG. The CZMG in
which agents use binary histories and the present case in
which the agents use the exact attendance histories, rep-
resent two extreme cases of information, i.e. fully coarse-
grained and fully detailed, respectively. As we saw, the
choice of the type of information or the level of coarse-
graining of past data, can have a significant effect on the
collective properties of the system. One may also con-
sider an intermediate level of coarse-graining of informa-
tion between the two extreme cases described above and
it will be instructive to study its effect on the emergent
properties. More generally, one can imagine a system in
which agents who use different levels of coarse-graining
of the past data (histories) coexist. The simplest setting
would be to consider a scenario in which a subpopula-
tion of agents use the identity of the past minority sides
to predict the identity of the future minority side and
the other subpopulation use the attendance of the past
minority sides for the same purpose.
It will be worthwhile to look into the rich literature on
Minority Game and its variants in light of the strategies
discussed here, where agents map exact information in
the past to future binary action.
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